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4Foreword
During the past decade, early warning and conflict prevention have acquired
substantial importance, at least in terms of political rhetoric. But a look at
what has actually been done has a sobering effect. What we see is relatively
few initiatives, for which scant resources are provided, inadequately
developed tools for the job and too little cooperation between the
participants. Viewed in this context, the High Commissioner on National
Minorities (HCNM) of the OSCE represents one of the most highly devel-
oped instruments for early warning and preventive measures. The activities
of the incumbent, Max van der Stoel, have been given uniformly high rat-
ings by political figures and in the scholarly literature. What is lacking,
however  (and the subject of our investigation, the HCNM, is unfortunately
typical for the state of political science) is a theoretically conducted and
empirically based analysis of the effectiveness of the High Commissioner as
an instrument of prevention. The investigation outlined here is intended to
help close this research gap.
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Gerhard Seewann and Dr Kathrin Sitzler of the Südost-Institute in Munich;
and, last but not least, Prof. Dr Alice Ackermann of the University of Mi-
ami. At IFSH I would like especially to thank the Director, Prof. Dr Dieter
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also like to offer special thanks to Claudia Eicher, MA, who tirelessly
discussed various versions of the text and, in addition, made a valuable
contribution on the subject of transformation theory.
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51. Summary
This project aims to examine the effectiveness of the OSCE minority re-
gime on the basis of  the implementation of the recommendations of the
OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities. The empirical objec-
tive is to investigate, using comparative case studies, whether and to which
degree the High Commissioner's recommendations during the period 1993
to 2000 have been implemented in legislation and in practice with regard to
the Russian minorities in Estonia, Latvia and the Ukraine; Hungarian mi-
norities in Romania and Slovakia; and the Albanian minority in Macedonia.
The theoretical objective  is to explain the differing forms of imple-
mentation of the High Commissioner's recommendations through the link-
age of partial theories (theories of transformation and nationalism, regime
analysis) which have been hitherto largely unconnected within the frame-
work of multi-level 'games'. On the basis of these empirical and theoretical
analyses we intend to formu late policy recommendations aimed at a better
understanding of the possibilities for dealing preventively with ethno-
political conflict situations and for optimizing the effectiveness of the
OSCE minority regime.
2. Status of Research, Preliminary Work at IFSH
2.1 Status of Research
The goal of this section is to provide the instruments both for the empirical
analysis as well as for the theoretical reflection. This includes reflecting
upon the question of what explanatory force the various (partial) theories
might have and how these different levels of action can be tied together.
Any project that seeks to investigate the effectiveness of the OSCE minority
regime in transformation countries of central and eastern Europe must com-
bine the latest research on the CSCE/OSCE with knowledge gained from
regime analysis as well as theories of transformation and nationalism. While
these partial theories certainly deal with the same subject, they do it from
various points of view and for different levels of action. The core subject of
regime analysis are the possibilities and limitations of international coop-
eration; so far it has had a difficult time dealing with the domestic political
implementation of sets of international rules already agreed upon. And this
issue remains a closed book to regime analysis when it looks at states as
unified actors. Conversely, it is usually difficult for transformation theories,
which study the interplay of structures and actors in the various phases of
6systemic change, to make the connection to the international level. On the
other hand, nationalism theory, which is newer, claims to be able to look at
the domestic, international and trans-national levels in an integrated way.
2.1.1 CSCE/OSCE
General Status of Research. Owing to significant changes in function and
institutional configuration we make a distinction between the 'old' CSCE
that existed until 1990 and the new 'CSCE/OSCE'. While the former was a
series of conferences aimed at cooperative defusing of one conflict situation
- the East-West confrontation - which influenced all sectors of political life,
the 'new' CSCE/OSCE has developed since the Charter of Paris in 1990 into
a (still) relatively weak organization with a range of instruments focused
mainly on conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilita-
tion and arms control.
Despite these differences, the status of research on the 'old' CSCE and the
'new' CSCE/OSCE reveals certain parallels. Most of the approximate 6,000
publications on the CSCE (Schlotter 1997: 7) consist of descriptive texts as
well as investigations of particular fields of activity or periods of time re-
lating to the CSCE without any theoretical framework to guide the analysis.
Another group of articles is prescriptive in nature and often the two types
appear in tandem. One important group of authors is made up of par-
ticipants in the various conferences and negotiations; this part of the litera-
ture "frequently provides detailed information on patterns of interests, ne-
gotiating tactics and bargaining processes" (Schlotter 1997: 37)1. This find-
ing with respect to the CSCE has also been applicable to the CSCE/OSCE
since 1990. Here, too, the analyses of particular events (e.g. Bloed 1994) or
sectors (e.g. Bloed/van Dijk 1991; Bloed/Leicht/Nowak/Rosas 1993), as
well as the prescriptive articles, tend to dominate. The most informative
ones often originate from people who have participated directly in the proc-
ess (e.g. Hennig 1995; Höynck 1996; von Tscharner/von Castelmur 1996;
Guldimann 1997; Honsowitz 1997). The most comprehensive account of
the development of the CSCE/OSCE between 1990 and 1996 was presented
by Ghebali (1996); topical articles are published especially in the "Helsinki
Monitor", the "OSCE Yearbook" produced by IFSH (1995,1996,1997) and
in certain publications of OSCE bodies such as the "ODIHR Bulletin" and
the "OSCE Newsletter".
                                                                
1 Translations from German-language literature are those of the author.
7By contrast the number of theoretically based analyses  on the CSCE and
OSCE, both before and after 1990, has been minimal. In the English lan-
guage literature the subject has been scarcely dealt with, not least because
the relative disdain with which politicians in the United States view the
CSCE/OSCE has made it an unattractive subject for political scientists
there. The first German language studies done on a theoretical basis dealt
with the effects of rules laid down in the CSCE (Kühne 1997) on inter-state
behaviour and hence with an issue which today would be regarded as be-
longing to regime analysis. After isolated and mostly inconsequential at-
tempts at the beginning of the eighties to view the CSCE process as "sym-
bolic security policy" (Schissler 1980) or, like Karl W. Deutsch, as a "plu-
ralistic security community", the investigation of the CSCE process on a
theoretical basis did not acquire noticeable momentum until the mid-eight-
ies as a result of the regime analysis approach that had in the meantime been
received in the Federal Republic of Germany.
This relates, on the one hand, to work done by the Tübingen working group
surrounding Rittberger. In addition to a number of sector analyses, among
them those by Efinger on confidence- and security-building measures
(1990) and von Zürn on inner-German trade (1990), substantial theoretical
consideration was devoted to regime analysis and its application to the East-
West context (Efinger/Rittberger/Zürn 1988; Rittberger/Zürn 1990). Based
on a problem-structural approach (cf. 2.1.2), one of the central conclusions
was that conflicts over values and power - e.g. those having to do with
human and minority rights - are the ones least amenable to settlement
through an international regime (Efinger/Zürn 1990: 75-78). It is question-
able, however, whether this proposition, derived from an analysis of the old
East-West relationship,  can be transferred unchanged to the OSCE context
of today. Not only are the power relationships in the OSCE world different
than those in the old East-West pattern but also our understanding of what
constitutes and what does not constitute illegitimate interference in the
sovereign affairs of a state has shifted substantially. Thus the CSCE par-
ticipating states at the 1991 human dimension meeting in Moscow declared
that "the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of
the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all particiating
states and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state con-
cerned." (Bloed 1993: 606) This calls for a new investigation, under altered
circumstances, of what problem areas are open to conflict settlement
through a regime, and to what extent.
8On the other hand, Schlotter, following preliminary work by Ropers and
Schlotter (1989), presented so far the most comprehensive theoretically
based analysis of the CSCE up to 1990, in which he concludes that "the
CSCE's contribution to resolving the East-West conflict has until now been
underestimated in the fields of academics and politics. The CSCE process
provides new evidence that international institutions, along with a demo-
cratic society, constitute the foundation of peaceful relations between
states" (1997: 396).
Theoretically based investigations of the 'new' CSCE/OSCE (from 1990 on)
have so far not gone beyond preliminary efforts (Staack 1992). This repre-
sents at once a weakness in available research and a research opportunity.
Although the instrument of regime analysis has been developed and refined
for more than 20 years , it has scarcely been used to date to investigate the
'new' CSCE/OSCE. This project seeks to help close this research gap.
The OSCE minority regime and the High Commissioner on National Mi-
norities. Neither in form nor content is the OSCE minority regime a unified
institution. Rather, it represents a multi-layered structure that has developed
incrementally, in the manner typical of the CSCE/OSCE. Even so, on a
primary level normative and instrumental2 elements can be identified which
constitute the core of the minority regime. They are set forth, in particular,
in the Copenhagen Document of 1990 (Bloed 1993: 439-465) and in the
mandate of the HCNM, which is a constituent part of the Helsinki Decisions
of 1992 (Bloed 1993: 715-721). On a secondary level regime elements can
be found relating to general provisions of the human dimension and, in
addition, the mechanism of the human dimension, the implementation
meetings, options for sanctions "in cases of clear, gross and [...] violations
of relevant CSCE commitments" concerning the "protection of human
rights, democracy and the rule of law" (Prague Document of 1992, in:
Bloed 1993: 832) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (Bloed 1993: 554-555; 744-748). These two levels are closely linked
to one another. A third level is mainly related to instrumental elements that
have no direct relationship to human rights and minority issues but can be
used for purposes related to them, e.g. the various councils, follow-up
meetings, missions, etc. (Bloed 1993: 711-715; 722-730; Bloed 1997: 153-
156).
                                                                
2 If we make a strict conceptual distinction between regime and organization, the High
Commissioner would have to be viewed as one organizational element of the OSCE which
was established for the purpose of preventing conflicts by implementing the OSCE mi-
nority regime.
9The HCNM is "an instrument of conflict prevention". He "will provide
'early warning' and, as appropriate, 'early action' at the earliest possible
stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which have
not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgement of
the High Commissioner, have the potential to develop into a conflict within
the CSCE area" (Bloed 1993: 715-716).
The concept of a minority is not defined in any CSCE/OSCE document nor,
a fortiori, is its further refinement, national minority3. Still, the choice of the
concept 'national minority", along with the relevant provisions of the man-
date, makes clear that the minority conflicts which are within the compe-
tence of the HCNM are, in particular, the ones that show a potential for
international escalation - and that is generally the case when the minority in
question can appeal to a patronage state4 or 'kin state' which is often located
in the vicinity. Thus the HCNM represents a "security-oriented approach to
minority rights" (Alfredsson/Türk 1993: 175) or, one might say, the pri-
marily political approach of the OSCE as compared with the more legal
approach of the Council of Europe (FIER  1997a: 41). Finally, one can also
view the HCNM as the instrument of an indirect strategy which presses for
the granting of minority rights because their observance is a necessary con-
dition of peace and stability.
Impartiality, independence, confidentiality and responsibility can be called
the most important working principles of the HCNM. His independence
finds expression in the fact that he chooses 'his own' cases and for this nei-
ther the agreement of OSCE bodies nor of the affected country is required.
The principle of confidentiality is evident in the fact that before taking ac-
tion he does not even need to inform the Permanent Council of the OSCE
(the Chairman-in-Office must be informed, however) and that the HCNM's
                                                                
3 Nonetheless, the High Commissioner has said: "I would dare to say that I know a minority
when I see one." (van der Stoel 1993: 22-25). Because there is no agreed upon definition
of the concept of a minority in scholarship or in politics, we shall for the time being use
the fundamental definition given by Capotorti: "A group numerically inferior to the rest of
the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of
the State - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the
rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards
preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language." (1979: 96) We would not, how-
ever, regard the criterion of citizenship ("being nationals of the State") as part of the defi-
nition. For basic information on the definition of 'minority' see Shaw 1992: 1-31.
4 We join Offe in characterizing as patronage state a state that assumes for itself the right or
duty to care for the citizens of another state who have the same nationality as those who
constitute the titular nation in the first-mentioned state (1994: 145). We characterize as
minority state a  state in which one or more minorities live.
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positions are stated publicly only when a consensus has been reached
among all participants. The HCNM's accountability to the Chairman-in-
Office demonstrates his responsibility and in addition it has become cus-
tomary for him to report regularly to the Permanent Council. The HCNM
must not take action in individual cases and he is prohibited to consider
national minority issues in situations involving organized acts of terrorism.
The instruments of his work are the collection of information, visits to ap-
propriate countries, the use of experts and the making of recommendations
to the appropriate government5; in addition he may issue formal early
warning declarations and recommend early action, upon which the Senior
Council must then decide. In fact, the HCNM has never used these last two
options. None of the measures of the HCNM is binding nor does any of
them have compulsory character (Zaagman 1994: 119-25, 142-53, 159-64;
FIER 1997a: 21-35).
Because of his range of possible actions the HCNM has become the centre-
piece of the OSCE minority regime. In accordance with Donnelly's classifi-
cation of human rights regimes, we for the present rate the OSCE minority
regime as one of "weak implementation" - stronger than one that is merely
declaratory or promotional but weaker than an "enforcement regime"
(1986:603). During the last five years almost a quarter of the OSCE's par-
ticipating states have allowed an international institution to intervene in
very specific ways in one of the most sensitive areas of national policy.
The results of the HCNM's work were given consistently favourable evalua-
tions at the OSCE implementation meetings on the Human Dimension in
1994 and 1996 (Buchsbaum/Hammer/Suntinger/Tretter 1994: 76; Pen-
tikäinen 1997: 10). Glover, however, emphasizes that it is difficult to esti-
mate the precise effect (1995: 59). Schlotter combines the two: "In the final
analysis the results of the High Commissioner's work are not easy to meas-
ure but his activity is generally regarded as the [emphasis in original] suc-
cess story of the C/OSCE after 1990." (1996: 116)
                                                                
5 Recommendations are first sent confidentially to the appropriat e government and later
released by the Permanent Council of the OSCE for publication. (Some recommendations
are documented in: Bloed 1993: 1065-1100; Bloed 1997: 649-829, and in the "Helsinki
Monitor").
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2.1.2 Regime Analysis
According to the classical definition by Krasner international regimes are
defined "as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given
area of international relations" (1982: 186). Rittberger added the require-
ment that only those sets of rules should be regarded as regimes which bring
about a certain measure of observable behavioural orientation (1993: 9-10).
In what follows we shall characterize as regimes only those international
institutions that meet the 'Rittberger criterion'; ineffective or not very effec-
tive sets of rules, under the terms of Keohane (1993: 27-28), will not be left
out of consideration but will be referred to as proto-regimes.
Regime analysis 6, which developed beginning in the mid-seventies in the
United States and was taken up about a decade later in (West) Germany,
was initially based squarely on the relationship between the two concepts of
"power and interdependence" (Keohane/Nye 1977/1989). Regimes were
viewed on the one hand as regulatory instruments based on norms and rules
for dealing with interdependence relationships (Keohane/Nye 1977/1989:
19); as "intermediate factors" (the same: 21) or as "intervening variables"
(Krasner 1982: 185) between the underlying power structure and specific
political consequences; on the other hand, they were seen as "autonomous
variables" (Krasner 1982a) that bring about independent effects. Hasen-
clever, Mayer and Rittberger, who have once again taken up this aspect,
emphasize that the specific element which regimes add to interdependence
relationships lies in their normative character and in "their functional role as
manifestations of international governance" (1997a: 4). According to our
current level of understanding it can be said that, first of all regimes cannot
be separated from the interdependence relationships on which they are
                                                                
6 Even a cursory account of the strands of theory in  regime analysis would exceed the space
available in this section. Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1997) distinguish between
three main schools of thought with numerous variations and much overlapping: Interest-
based theories (neoliberalism - we prefer the term 'institutionalism') identify international
regimes that deal with the failure of political markets (Keohane 1984; Axelrod/Keohane
1986), in terms of situation and problem structures (Efinger/Rittberger/Zürn 1988; Rittber-
ger/Zürn 1990; Efinger/Zürn 1990; Rittberger 1993) and in terms of the processes of in-
stitutional bargaining (Young 1989, 1991, 1994). Power-based theories (realism) empha-
size hegemony (Kindleberger 1981), distributional conflicts (Krasner 1991, 1993) and
relative gains (Grieco 1988, 1993). Weak knowledge-based theories explain regimes
through the role of ideas and epistemic communities (P. Haas 1989, 1993), strong knowl-
edge-based theories through the idea of an international society (Hurrell 1993), the role of
communications processes (Müller 1994) and/or the effect of social identities (Wendt
1994). In what follows we shall limit ourselves to a problem-oriented description of those
theoretical aspects that are of importance for our project.
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based. Secondly, they regulate asymmetric relationships in such a way that
the role of power is not obscured and the cooperation embodied in the re-
gime cannot be separated from the structure of the underlying conflict
(Keohane/Nye 1977/1989: 10; Effinger/Rittberger/Zürn 1988: 61-62).
Thirdly, regimes expand inter-dependence relationships by adding a nor-
mative instrument of regulation with independent effects. And, fourthly the
concept of interdependence itself makes clear that "foreign policy is inte-
grally related to domestic structures and processes" (Haggard/Simmons
1987: 499) because one necessary condition of independence lies in an
adequate level of international linkage and division of labour.
There is a broad consensus today which reaches far into the realistic school
of thought (Krasner 1991, 1993; for the opposing position see Mearsheimer
1995) that regimes are effective or can be so. A striking contrast, however,
is provided by the long raised complaint, (Young 1986: 115; Keohane/Nye
1987: 742-743; Nollkaemper 1992: 54) that relatively few studies dealing
with the effectiveness of regimes are available.7 As we see it this shortage
of theory-based empirical analyses of effectiveness is no coincidence but
results from four areas of weakness in the field of theory, one of which
relates specifically to the institutionalist (and cognitive) school of thought
while the other three concern the rationalist8 schools.The first weakness lies
in neglecting the power-political context of a given regime . The develop-
ment of theory since the end of the seventies produced within the institu-
tional paradigm a relative separation between the analysis of international
regimes and the interdependence and power relationships supporting them
(Kohler-Koch 1989: 51); regimes were for the most part investigated on
their own terms. German research on regimes has so far attached little value
to factors related to the power structure. More recently, however, Hasen-
clever, Mayer and Rittberger have not only dealt thoroughly with various
realist approaches (1997: 83-135) but are arguing the case for giving prior-
ity to the search for mutually supportive aspects of the two big schools of
thought (1997: 135).
                                                                
7 For attempts to deal in theoretical-conceptual terms with the problem of regime effective-
ness, see Nollkaemper 1992 and Breitmeier/Wolf 1993; for an empirical study of effec-
tiveness, Müller 1993 is particularly good.
8 The basic assumption of institutionalism, which is shared by realism , is, in the words of
Keohane: "Rationality means that [actors] have consistent, ordered preferences, and that
they calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximize their
utility in view of those preferences. [...] Variations in [actors'] behavior are accounted for
not by variations in their values, or in the efficiency of their internal organizational ar-
rangements, but by variations in characteristics of the [...] system" (1984: 27). Thus both
institutionalism and realism start with a strongly systemic approach which rules out the
domestic political level as an independent variable in explaining international actions.
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Three additional weaknesses of theory result from the fact that the two
leading schools of thought (institutionalism and realism) agree on the as-
sumption that states should be regarded as rationally acting utility maximiz-
ers, with the state that acts in a unitary way representing the individual
(Hasenclever/Mayer/Rittberger 1997: 23).
The second weakness of rationalist theories of action lies in the externali-
zation of domestic political processes and structures. There is widespread
criticism that both the realist and the institutionalist variants of regime
analysis leave the domestic political dimension largely out of consideration.
Haggard and Simmons (1987: 499) as well as Milner (1992: 481) blame this
on the use of game theory or rather, in the case of realism, on the anarchy
assumption - and they call for the (re)integration of domestic policy as an
elementary prerequisite for understanding international cooperation. There
appear to be two promising ways to achieve this. One can, as Zürn deter-
mined, use domestic policy to create "foreign policy types that are regime-
conducive" (1993: 292). This would be logical in situations involving re-
gime creation. Or one can join Moravcsik in an approach based on prefer-
ence structures, first of social and then state actors (1992, 1997), and build-
ing on this foundation (along the lines of Risse-Kappen) a model for do-
mestic political conflict which links the potential for social conflict to the
possibilities for political solutions (1991, 1995) and ties the various prefer-
ence and conflict structures together by way of the interdependence con-
cept. This course which, in contrast to the main trend in the discipline of
international relations, proceeds from the constituent units to the system and
for precisely that reason is particularly suitable for investigations of the
effectiveness of regimes, is the one we shall follow (see below and section
3.2.1).
The third weakness of rationalist theories of action lies in the externaliza-
tion of the actors' orders of preference. Ultimately it makes no difference
whether the rational utility maximizer is conceived of as a defensive or
offensive positionalist (realism) or as a maximizer of interests (institution-
alism); what is of vital importance is that in this approach changes in the
actors' orders of preference cannot be investigated because they are ob-
scured by definition. Changes in the orders of preference are important,
because it is only by registering them that the effect of regimes can be ex-
plained. For there is a logical contradiction between the model of individual
utility maximization and the assumption of norm-guided cooperation within
the framework of regimes. A way out of this dilemma can perhaps be found
in the proposal of Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, drawing on Weber's
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theory of ideal types (1972: 12-3), to bring together the two aspects of stra-
tegic rationality (Zweckrationalität) and value rationality (Wertrationalität)
(1997a: 25). This type of behaviour would follow neither the rational logic
of benefits nor universal values but, rather, the specific scale of values of a
national political system. Agreement or difference between this scale of
values and that of the regime in question could serve as a standard for
measuring the regime's effectiveness or robustness (ibid.). This way of
attacking the problem, however, has certain consequences for the basic
theoretical assumptions of the institutional approach as well as of all
strongly systemic approaches: for, if the specific scales of values or orders
of preference of individual states are taken as variables for explaining the
effects of regimes, then a weak systemic approach is needed to link the
explanation of how orders of preference are formed in the domestic political
context with the explanation of their international effectiveness when they
encounter the orders of preference of other international actors.
The fourth weakness of the rationalist theory of action lies in its limited
ability to take account of communications processes. It is generally undis-
puted that "[s]tates can and do communicate" (Milner 1992: 480), that this
communication is relevant for the development of cooperation and is not
taken sufficiently into consideration in the rationalist theory of action
(Zangl/Zürn 1996: 348). What is very much in dispute - especially in the
debate that is being conducted in Germany - is whether a new theory of
communicative action is needed (Müller 1994, 1995) or whether the mode
of argumentative communication can be integrated into rationalist theories
(Keck 1995; Zangl/Zürn 1996). As things now stand, this discussion cannot
be made productive for empirical work so that we shall limit ourselves to
"determining the relative importance of argumentative and strategic be-
haviour for the various levels" (Zangl/Zürn 1996: 362) in order to draw
conclusions about the specific requirements of a theory of communicative
action or to get more ideas about whether and how such a theory can be
linked to rationalist action theories.
None of the schools of thought in regime analysis has so far been in a posi-
tion to explain the whole range of problems. This applies especially to hu-
man rights and minority regimes. Against this background of specific
strengths and weaknesses of the various schools of thought, the liberal the-
ory of international relations developed by Moravcsik (1992, 1997), which
has not yet found much acceptance in Germany, could be helpful.
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Moravcsik makes three basic assumptions: Firstly, he regards individuals
and social groups with specific interests and preferences as the basic actors
in international politics (1997: 516). Secondly, he assumes that states always
represent a certain portion of the preference orders of the social actors
(1997: 518). With his third assumption, Moravcsik moves from a domestic
political theory to a (weak) systemic one: "The configuration of interde-
pendent state preferences determines state behaviour" (1997: 520). The link
between national preference orders and international behaviour lies in the
"concept of policy interdependence" (ibid.). Ultimately, Moravcsik says,
"the form, substance, and depth of cooperation [and conflict - the author]
depends directly on the nature of these patterns of preferences" (1997: 521).
At the same time, Moravcsik's approach remains open to "any multicausal
synthesis with realist and institutionalist theory" as long as the priority of
socially based state orders of preference, as the fundamental explanatory
variable, is not called into question (1997: 543). Using Moravcsik's ap-
proach as our starting point, we plan to take the following steps:
· First we assume that the relative distance between the ethno-political
preference orders of majority and minority(ies) represents the ethno-
political conflict potential of a country, and that the preference order of
the OSCE minority regime represents an offer of a solution that can be
applied flexibly by the HCNM. The effectiveness of the regime can be
measured by the size of the gaps between the three orders of prefer-
ence. Since the concept of an "ethno-political preference order or scale
of values" (we use these concepts as synonyms) is still very general and
lacking in content, we shall look in the next section (2.1.3) at national-
ism theories to see what they might contribute to filling it out and mak-
ing it empirically operational.
· Second we turn to the question of what processes in transformation
countries determine which actors will be able to get their specific pref-
erence orders accepted at the state level. For this purpose we shall, in
section 2.1.4, examine transformation theories to see what they can
contribute to conceptualizing and making empirically operational the
institutionalization of political representation in the transformation
countries of central and eastern Europe.
· Third we shall attempt in our work program (3.2.1), on the basis of
Risse-Kappen (1991, 1995), to combine the conflict potential repre-
sented in the preference orders of majority and minority(ies) with the
potential for conflict solution that may (possibly) lie in political repre-
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sentation so as to create a general, ethno-political model of conflict
structure.
· Fourth we shall include the factor of power conceptually by viewing
regimes as theme-oriented, independently effective, normative instru-
ments of regulation of generally asymmetrical interdependence rela-
tionships. With regard to the OSCE minority regime, we want to in-
vestigate which relative position power can claim as an explanatory
factor and how power as an explanatory factor relates to other factors,
especially the effectiveness of the relative distance between the prefer-
ence orders of the actors (cf. 3.2.2). Since this question links the na-
tional level with the international and trans-national levels, we will first
discuss the relationship between the various levels of inter-action in
terms of multi-level 'games' in section 2.1.5.
· Fifth we assume that the method of pursuing preferences can ideal-
typically be of a strategic or communicative kind. This relationship
seems to us to be sufficiently interesting to look into even though there
has so far been no significant theoretical work done on it. Following a
suggestion of Zangl and Zürn (1996: 362) we want first to clarify at
what levels and under what conditions strategic behaviour appears to be
inadequate as an explanation and in need of supplementation by ele-
ments of communication theory.
 
 
 2.1.3 Theories of Nationalism
 
 In the few years since the upheaval of 1989/1990 expectations about ethno-
political developments in Central and Eastern Europe have twice changed
substantially. Indeed there were few who believed in "the end of his tory"
(Fukayama 1989) but the hope that "ethno-nationalistic conflicts could be
defused and settled without the use of force" (Senghaas 1990: 87) was
widespread. With the war in Yugoslavia this feeling was completely turned
around. In the meantime, the view has found acceptance that developments
in the CIS and in Central Europe are taking different courses qualitatively,
that the territory of former Yugoslavia (minus Slovenia) should be regarded
as a special case and that in the rest of Central Europe there is "no automatic
spiral of rising nationalism based on social tensions" (Segert/Machos 1995:
302). These occasionally dramatic changes in scholarly expectations, di-
rectly dependent on certain events (or non-events), underline the fact that
there is little available to meet the need for a theory of nationalism with
explanatory power. Because the mainstream of social science has for dec-
ades tended to discount the national factor as an outworn category, owing to
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the growing integration of Western European states, there has been a clear
"loss of reality in the analytical work of social science" (Schödl 1993: 124).
In view of the large number of ethno-political conflicts, both manifest and
latent, we must now examine the extent to which older approaches or, alter-
natively, the newer tools of institutionalism can contribute to explaining
them.
 
 At the centre of classical theories of nationalism are questions about the
character of the nation and its relationship to the nation-state. The answers
are for the most part to be derived from the varying development of nation-
states and the self-image of the corresponding nations of Western, Central
and Eastern Europe.9 In the development of theory, the developmental type
in Western Europe provided the basis for the so-called subjective approach
while the development in Central and Eastern Europe underlies the so-
called objective approach. Subjective definitions of the nation emphasize as
their constitutive element the decision (Kohn 1948: 15) and the act of will
involved in building a nation (Schieder 1991: 69; see also Weber 1972: 242
and 258; Lepsius 1990: 233; Anderson 1993: 15). The subjective approach
assumes that a state exists within firm borders (Kohn 1948: 3-4) and is
accordingly state-oriented. However, as representatives of the subjective
line of thought themselves admit, the concept is neither easy to bring into
focus nor universally applicable but, rather, derived from the development
of Western European nation-states (Schieder 1991: 69-71).
 
 The objective approach attempts to define a nation by using objective crite-
ria such as descent, language, culture, history, etc. (Brunner 1996: 18). Be-
cause neither firm borders nor nation-states existed in Eastern and Central
Europe, "neither the territory nor the state play a decisive role" in the objec-
tive approach (Brunner 1996: 18). But this concept, too, is not easy to bring
into focus or universally applicable and its criteria are not clear. An addi-
tional point is that objectively drawn up criteria for a nation can be easily
reinterpreted as quasi natural features essential to the character of the nation
- a process that actually encourages the creation of national myths.
 
 Neither of these classical schools provides an adequate framework for
analysis of today's ethno-political conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe.10
                                                                
 9 Cf. the three types of nations according to Lepsius: "civic nation" (Staatsbürgernation),
"cultural nation" (Kulturnation), and "people's nation" (Volksnation) (1990: 235-45).
 10 Deutsch developed his concept of people and nation as a function of the capabilities,
possibilities and habits of large groups of people in respect to communication (Deutsch
1953), as an  "all-purpose communications network" (Deutsch 1972: 204) of an ethnic
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For one thing, the distinction between subjective and objective approaches,
despite occasional attempts to revive it, has long since been overtaken
(Mommsen/Martiny 1971: 637). Moreover, both lines of thought, in light of
progress that has been achieved in other sectors of political science, have a
number of methodological weaknesses.
 
 The first weakness of the approaches focused on the nation is that the nature
of the respective definitions leads almost unavoidably to one-sided and
exaggerated statements about the character of ethno-political conflicts.
While a certain inevitability of ethno-political conflict does seem to follow
from the objective approach, the subjective approach suggests a largely
arbitrary manipulability of the ethnic factor, including the possibility of
ending this manipulation with equal arbitrariness.
 The second weakness of the traditional nation-based approaches is that they
fail to take account of the latest insights of the 'new' institutionalism. Ac-
cording to the latter, institutions represent value and procedural systems
which not only determine and limit the range of possible actions of actors
but also establish their preference orders and interests (Brubaker 1996: 24).
Institutions are not simply given but are the result of bargaining processes
involving various actors.
 
 Closely related to this is the third weakness  of the approaches focused on
nations which is that they do not take account of the interactive character of
related action patterns - in our case the interaction between the nationalizing
state, the national minority and the “patronage state“ (Offe 1994: 145) or
kin state nor of the internal differentiations and debates within these units,
not to mention the reciprocal influences between these two levels.
 
 In contrast to the approaches focused on the nation, we do not conceive of
nations as political collectives, and thus actors, but as political institutions.
For us, the 'nation' represents neither the analytical starting point nor the
central analytical category; it is, rather, in whatever institutional form it may
                                                                                                                                        
group or a people. Whether Deutsch's communications theory could serve as the basis for a
modern institutionalist theory to explain ethno-political conflicts must remain open here. It
is indisputable that this approach has many innovative elements, especially its way of
overcoming the dualism between the subjective and objective principle, the concept of
"ethnic learning" (Deutsch 1953: 148) and the linkage between nation and nationalism and
the processes of economic modernization, the social layers that support them and the
opening to the level of actors which is thereby achieved. Although Deutsch is still fre-
quently quoted, his framework of analysis, which was developed in the fifties, has not ex-
perienced much further development, nor has it been tested through empirical studies to
any great extent.
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take, the result of processes of debate and bargaining between political
actors (Brubaker 1996: 18) that must be further defined. The political insti-
tution called 'nation' cannot be defined in terms of immanent characteristics
but is the result of a fundamentally open development process which must,
and can, be investigated empirically. Thus an institutionalist theory of na-
tionalism does not use definitions of the nation as its starting point but tries
to grasp the actors and processes that create very specific kinds and struc-
tures of nations. Because it is not nations but political actors who bring
about nationalism (ibid.: 17) we do not speak of ethnic conflicts but of
ethno-political ones (Sapper 1997: 326).
 
 By the ethnification of political conflicts we understand the introduction
into the political process of elements related to ethnic groups in the sense of
communities defined by descent, language and culture (Kimminich 1985:
25; Weber 1972: 237; Heckmann 1992: 36-38). According to Offe, the
ethnification of political conflicts can be an entirely "'rational' strategy" for
certain actors. He gives a number of reasons for this, from "overcoming the
old regime" to the "economic function of borders" and "ethnicity as a strate-
gic resource of status groups" (1994: 151-169).  The weaknesses of the
political system during the transformation process appear to be of central
importance for the ethnification of political conflicts (Sapper 1997: 329;
Schöpflin 1997: 6) and we shall return to this factor in the work program
(cf. 3.2.2). Another group of factors are historical determinants such as the
dichotomic thinking in friend-enemy categories which was particularly in-
tense during the era of real socialism and in varying degrees and ways con-
tinues to influence the culture of conflict in the transformation societies of
Central and Eastern Europe (Sapper 1997: 329-330). But we should also not
forget factors that work in the opposite direction such as the conditions for
membership in the EU and NATO which can cause countries that are will-
ing and able to integrate, if not to deethnificize their political culture, at
least to get their ethno-political conflicts under better control (cf. 3.2.2).
 We agee with Brubaker that the three most important actors in ethno-politi-
cal conflicts are "nationalizing states", national minorities and "external
homelands" (1996: 55ff.) or kin states, which stand in a triadic relationship
of interaction with one another. The concept of a 'nationalizing state', in
contrast to 'nation-state', highlights, based on the self-image of the state in
question, the incomplete or still-to-be-finished character of this nationaliza-
tion process (Brubaker 1996: 63). Nationalizing states do not see them-
selves (yet) as completed nation-states, but definitely want to achieve that
status. A national minority views itself as a nation which is ethno-culturally
different from the majority nation and seeks recognition of this difference
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along with certain cultural and/or political rights in order to secure and
maintain its distinct identity (ibid.: 60).11 Quite apart from numerical rela-
tionships, however, a group that is regarded as not politically dominant can
be considered a minority. The concepts of 'minority' and 'majority' do not
represent established, immanent magnitudes but in each case develop out of
specific strategies and bargaining processes on the part of actors. In the case
of the Russians this can go beyond the creation of an ethnic group in the
narrow sense and lead to national-cultural or language-based minorities
("Russian-speaking") (Kolstoe 1995; Lebedeva 1995; Chinn/Kaiser 1996).
The kin state assumes a specific right to care for those citizens of another
state who belong to the nation which constitutes the majority in the kin
state.12 Conversely, the kin state provides the focal point for trans-national
activities of the minority.
 The nationalizing state, the national minority and the kin state have an inter-
dependent and interactive relationship (Brubaker 1996: 69) that includes
domestic political, international and trans-national levels and can best be
understood through multi-level 'games' (Putnam 1988; Zangl 1994, 1995;
cf, 2.1.5). The widespread notion of unified actors must, however, be aban-
doned (Brubaker 1996: 62); the behaviour of minorities, nationalizing states
and kin states results from contradictory individual interests and strategies
within these groups of actors. Hence, the three-sided relationship is deter-
mined by the interaction of the three groups of actors but, beyond that also
by the reaction of each group of actors to the behaviour of sub-units of the
other two corresponding groups. In this connection, it is not only the do-
mestic political relationship between majority and minority that is funda-
mentally asymmetrical (Sapper 1997: 329) but the trans-national relation-
ship between the kin state and the minority also has essentially the same
character. Thus one can speak of a double asymmetry between ethno-po-
litical conflict situations in which the national minority stands between the
rival claims of the nationalizing state and the kin state. In complex ethno-
political conflict situations, where there are a number of national minorities
in a state and/or the same national minority plays a role in a number of
states, the three-sided approach must be an analytical framework with a
                                                                
 11 We distinguish between migration minorities which (even a long time ago) immigrated to
the minority state, and political minorities which came about through the collapse of states
or the drawing of new borders. Many observations - in Romania, for example, with respect
to the German or Hungarian minority - suggest that political minorities are in the habit of
making much more extensive demands (we owe this thought to Gerhard Seewann, conver-
sation on 16.1.1998).
 12 The discussion as to whether parts of the Russian population in the 'near abroad' will, in
the long run, develop an identity of their own as a diaspora that is distinct from the core
population of Russia has not yet been concluded (cf. Kolstø 1996).
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number of poles (Brusis 1997: 69); for example, then the interaction be-
tween various national minorities living in the same country and their kin
states can acquire relevance (cf. 2.1.5).
 
 There remains the question of what categories can be used to comprehend
the content of ethno-political conflicts. Since ethno-political conflicts con-
cern the relations between nations as well as between nations and the state,
the character of nation- and state-building strategies appears to be suitable
as the main analytical category. Linz/Stepan distinguish between unifying
and differentiating nation-building strategies and between inclusionary and
exclusionary state-building strategies of the majority and through the su-
perimposition of these two strategy levels arrive at a four-field table con-
cerning four types of ethno-political strategies: an "exit" strategy involving
an exclusionary state-building and a unfying nation-building strategy in
which the minority is either driven out or at least encouraged to leave the
country on its own initiative; an isolation strategy made up of an exclusion-
ary state-building and a differentiating nation-building strategy which grants
the minority civil and social rights but not political ones; an assimilation
strategy made up of an inclusionary state-building strategy and an unifying
nation-building strategy which does give political rights to the minority, but
at the price of their ethno-cultural identity; and, finally, a strategy of balance
based on an inclusionary state-building strategy and a differentiating nation-
building strategy which draws the minority into the construction of the state
but does not seek in the process to take away their cultural particuliarity
(Linz/Stepan 1996: 429).
 
 This concept has the significant advantage of describing both the relation-
ship between nations as well as their relationship to the state in terms of
general schemes of value preferences. However, Linz/Stepan limit them-
selves to the state- and nation-building strategies of the majority and thus
fail to take account of the inter-active nature of the relationship between
majority, minority and kin state. Moreover, they leave out the factor of
territoriality, to which both Brubaker (1996: 30) and Offe (1994: 145-146)
ascribe central importance as a criterion of ethno-political institutionaliza-
tion. Since the presence or absence in state-building strategies of the factor
of territorial differentiation plays a big role in the relationship between
majorities and minorities - the latter frequently demand 'territorial auton-
omy' whereupon the former generally fear that there is a desire for secession
- we have combined the approaches of Brubaker and Linz/Stepan in such a
way as to dis tinguish, in connection with state-building, both between
ethno-territorial and non-ethno-territorial and between inclusionary and
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exclusionary strategies; in connection with nation-building between unify-
ing and differentiating strategies. When these three characteristics are
superimposed the result is an eight-field scheme which we view as an
ethno-political value or preference table for one group of actors. The ethno-
political conflict potential does not emerge from this one table (the majority
in Linz/Stepan) but from the distance between the ethno-political preference
tables for the majority, the minority and the kin state. The greater the differ-
ence between these preference tables, the greater is the ethno-political con-
flict potential (cf. 3.2.2).
 
 Table 1: Ethno-political Preference Table
 
   State-building Strategy
   Non-territorial  Territorial
   Inclusionary  Exclusionary  Inclusionary  Exclusionary
 Nation-
 building
 Unifying  Assimilation  Expulsion
 Emigration
 -  Secession
 Division
 Strategy  Different-
 iating
 Balance  Isolation  Territorial
 Autonomy
 Confederation
 
 This ethno-political preference table certainly does not represent a new
approach to a theory of nationalism. But it gives us an instrument of analy-
sis, compatible with regime analysis, that can take account of and compare
in terms of value categories both individual strands of action and institu-
tional development strategy, for the three groups of actors as well as exter-
nal actors - the HCNM, for example. With our empirical material in hand,
we plan to investigate the theoretical question of what explanatory force can
be assigned to our instrument for analyzing preference structures based on
the three categories of state- and nation-building, along with territoriality;
and also the extent to which other categories must be added in order to be
able to explain the dynamics of ethno-political conflicts.
 
 
 2.1.4 Transformation Theories
 
 Since our investigation is concerned with post-communist states which are
going through complex transformation processes, it is important to examine
the emergence and influence of these processes on the development and
control of majority-minority conflicts.
 
 With regard to transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, we join Mer-
kel in viewing this process as a "change of system" (initially in
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Beyme/Nohlen 1991: 690-700) which is tantamount to "the dissolution of
the old structure of political rule and the construction of a new one" (1994:
13). The concept of 'system' has the advantage, in comparison with the 're-
gime' concept13 of being more comprehensive and including, along with the
political aspects of the system, the social, economic and cultural ones (ibid.:
13) whose simultaneous (and at the same time not simultaneous) change -
Offe talks about the "dilemma of simultaneity" (1994: 57ff.) - constitutes
the special difficulty and historic uniqueness of the transformation in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. By transformation we understand the entire process
of systemic change "with substantial loss of differentiation and then redif-
ferentiation in agreement with the new principles, norms and environmental
requirements" (Merkel 1994: 13) and their long-term institutionalization
and internalization. On the other hand "transition could refer to the develop-
mental stage between the collapse or fall of a regime and the establishment
of a durable new political order" (Glaeßner 1994: 126).
 
 For the purposes of our investigation it is permissible to concentrate on the
political dimension of the transformation process and to regard economic
development as an external factor.14 Economic development is certainly of
great importance for the long-term maintenance of democracy (Przeworski
et al. 1996: 49), but no direct relationship can be demonstrated between the
level of economic development and the probability of democratization
(ibid.: 40). Since democracies make it possible to have alternative policies
and changes of government without a change of regime they are even more
flexible in easing socio-economic difficulties than are authoritarian regimes.
Linz and Stepan estimate that young democracies have about eight years
time (two governmental periods) to achieve economic improvements (1996:
79). Because this period of time largely corresponds to the period we are
investigating and the economic dimension is not part of the OSCE's arsenal
of preventive instruments (FIER 1997a: 12), we are not including the eco-
nomic dimension in our variables but are viewing it as an external factor.
 
 There is general agreement now about dividing the transformation process
into three phases: liberalization, democratization and consolidation (Mer-
kel/Sandschneider/ Segert 1996: 13). However, it turns out to be difficult to
define them precisely and to determine the sequence of phases. The phases
                                                                
 13 The concept of regime as used here has a different meaning from the regime concept used
in connection with international regimes. Here, regime refers to  a "more permanent form
of political rule" than is signified by governments (Eicher 1998: 42).
 14 With regard to this paragraph cf. Eicher 1998, Chapter 3.2 Democracy and Capitalism, 72-
78.
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can (ideally) succeed each other. But they can also exist in a relationship of
tension to one another, whereby individual elements of one phase prevent
the appearance of other elements in subsequent phases (Nohlen/Thibaut
1994: 198; Karl/Schmitter 1991: 270f.).
 
 Consolidation15 is of critical importance for our investigation. It is the most
difficult to deal with and takes the longest time. The consolidation phase
begins with the establishment of a democratically elected government.
There is a wide variety of opinions on the advantages and disadvantages of
particular governmental, electoral and party systems but it is in the semi-
presidential systems of Eastern Europe that consolidation has made the least
progress (Linz 1993, 1993a; Lijphart 1993; Mainwaring 1993; Merkel 1996:
77-80; Merkel/Sandschneider/Segert 1996: 25-9).
 
 According to Merkel (1995: 5; 1996: 12; 1997: 11) consolidation can be
understood as  a "sequence of three interlocking phases"  which in terms of
content and time to a large extent combine and fold into each other: struc-
tural consolidation (constitution, organization of the state, rule of law);
representative consolidation (intermediate representation of interests, espe-
cially parties); and the civil/cultural "consolidation of a civic culture" (Mer-
kel 1997: 11). In his latest article on the systems change Merkel adds to this
trio the phase of behavioural consolidation (1997: 11). Like the division into
three transformation phases, this distinction is analytical in character.
 
 One necessary condition for the long-term success of consolidation is the
existence of a national identity and secure borders (Linz/Stepan 1996: 16-
37; Plasser/Ulram/Waldrauch 1997: 41f.). But if there are serious differ-
ences over the right to citizenship or the territorial borders of the state are in
dispute, Linz and Stepan speak of a "stateness problem" (1996: 16). At the
beginning of consolidation, recognition of ethnic identity has priority over
all other lines of conflict (Wolff-Poweska 1997: 25), even over issues re-
lated to distribution of wealth and to class (Offe 1994: 137). Identity con-
flicts are different from other socio-economic conflicts, in which goods can
be shared, because they involve apparently indivisible values, and for this
reason there is the danger that ethno-centric friend/foe patterns will develop.
Contrary tendencies, which might favour the creation of multiple identities,
                                                                
 15 On the other phases and modes of transformation see, among others, Bos 1994; Bova
1991; Dix 1994; Eicher 1998; Huntington 1991/92; Karl/Schmitter 1991; Linz/Stepan
1996; Mainwaring 1992; Merkel et al. 1996; O'Donnell/Schmitter/Whitehead 1986; Prze-
worski 1991, 1992; Remmer 1991; Valenzuela 1992; von Beyme 1994; Waldrauch 1994;
Winderl 1994.
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quickly run up against their limits (at this stage), owing to the lack of con-
solidation and the precarious economic situation (Sapper 1997: 330). Thus
there is the danger, in ethnically divided post-communist societies, that the
conflict potential will grow, intensified by newly acquired rights of partici-
pation, organization and communication - while the capacity of the still
labile political systems to regulate these conflicts through collectively bind-
ing decisions is starkly overtaxed (Offe 1994: 150f.). In consolidated de-
mocracies, by contrast, the relationship between ethnic forces and the state
is subject to regulation by democratic mechanisms (Schöpflin 1997: 7).
However, this statement leaves unanswered the question of why consoli-
dated democracies like France and Great Britain have had, and continue to
have, unsolved ethno-political conflicts. Thus when Sapper equates consoli-
dation with the creation of new structures for regulating conflicts (197:
329ff.), it is understood that although consolidation represents a necessary
condition, it is by no means a sufficient one for the control of ethno-political
conflicts. Because political identities are not fixed quantities and can be
easily instrumentalized, the character of democratic institutions becomes a
particularly important criterion for the success of consolidation
(Linz/Stepan 1996: 35). Political institutions become the "missing link
between the systemic macro-level and the micro-level of action theory"
(Merkel 1996: 74).
 
 According to Merkel/Sandschneider/Segert there are two criteria, in par-
ticular, that are of decisive importance for the success of democratic con-
solidation: "social and political inclusion" and "institutional efficiency"
(1996: 24-25), with particular importance being attached to the principle of
inclusion in ethnically fragmented societies (Merkel 1996: 97). In such
societies, therefore, consolidation can only be successful if the state is able
to ensure "inclusive and equal citizenship" (Linz/Stepan 1996: 33-37), in-
cluding full civil rights, for all citizens. The factor of inclusion can be tested
through the "mode of political decision-making" (Merkel 1996: 95) in the
classic confrontation between consensus and majority principle. The factor
of efficiency can be operationalized on the one hand as the 'degree of effi-
cient delimitation of competences between the individual organs of the state'
in the sense of a functional division of labour between institutions on the
horizontal level (Rüb 1996: 63) or, on the other hand, in terms of whether
and to what extent the political decision-making process takes place within
the institutions constitutionally provided for it (Rüb 1996: 62).
 
 The success of a consolidation process is by no means assured. It can come
to a halt at any stage and in a variety of configurations or it can 'reverse'
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itself. One of the main causes of threatened non-consolidation or of long-
lasting blockages of consolidation could lie in the effects of certain state-
and nation-building strategies. This connection between the general course
of transformation and its ethno-national element, which may be dominant
under certain conditions has not so far been adequately examined, either by
transformation theory or by research on nationalism (but see Linz/Stepan
1996: 401-433). Key issues in this context are:
 
· Which specific state- and nation-building strategies are compatible with
a positive course of consolidation and which not? Where are the lines
of fracture and what is the indispensable minimum for successful con-
solidation? How is it defined?
· Conversely, is there a minimum of democratic consolidation that is
needed to get the processes of state- and nation-building going in such
a way that they do not prevent or hinder further consolidation? In what
time framework?
· Are there correspondences between certain types of consolidation proc-
esses and specific state- and nation-building strategies?
· And, going further: Is the conceptual framework for the nationalizing
behaviour of states in terms of nation- and/or state-building at all ade-
quate for coming to grips with the specifics of nationalisms as they are
operative today (Brubaker 1996: 10)?
 
 
 2.1.5 Levels of Interaction and Multi-level 'Games'
 
 According to Brubaker the three central actors in conflicts configured
around national minorities are the majority, the minority and the kin state
(1996: 4). Owing to the expansion of western integration, the EU and
NATO, as international organizations that establish conditions for member-
ship, must be included as additional group of actors.16 Hence the structure
of interaction between participants in a majority-minority conflict can be
represented by four inter-locking levels of action and communication:
 
                                                                
 16 The same holds true in principle for the Council of Europe and the OSCE. But because
these two organizations must be rated as creating no more than "weak obligations"
(Rittberger 1994: 33) and because their membership requirements differentiate little or
scarcely at all, and since membership in them does not establish a relationship of complex
interdependence, they are neglected at this level of analysis as actors effective at an all-en-
compassing level.
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· the majority-minority relationship in the minority state in question
(level I);
· the bilateral-international relationship between the governments of the
minority state and the kin state (level II);
· the multilateral-international relationship between the governments of
the minority state or the kin state and the western organizations EU and
NATO (level III);
· the trans-national relationship17  between the minority and its kin state,
especially the government of that state (level IV).
 Additional levels of interaction - for example the domestic political one in
the kin state or the transnational one between various minorities of the same
nationality - are not of sufficient importance for our investigation's purposes
to justify including them in a research design that must be kept parsimoni-
ous. Taking Putnam's (1988) concept of 'win sets' as a starting point, a sub-
stantial literature has developed over the past ten years on two- or multi-
level 'games' (Moravcsik 1993; Evans 1993; Zangl 1994, 1995) which have
been more and more frequently used (e.g. the case studies in Ev-
ans/Jacobson/Putnam 1993; Patterson 1997). One 'win set' for a given level
x is determined by the quantity of all possible bargaining results on level y
which can be politically implemented on level x (Putnam 1988: 437). What
is important for our analysis is that this concept can be combined with the
most varied theories (Putnam 1998: 442). The concept of the 'win set' is
supplemented by that of the 'acceptability set' which describes the quantity
of negotiating results preferred by an actor (Moravcsik 1993: 30). The pref-
erence differences between government and opposition and, through them,
the effects of changes of coalitions and governments, can be determined
from the deviations between 'win' and 'acceptability sets'.
 
 
 2.2 Preliminary Work at IFSH
 
 Problems of conflict prevention and conflict management in the transforma-
tion states of Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, and the normative,
instrumental and political problem-solving abilities of the CSCE/OSCE
related thereto have for years constituted the most important field of re-
search for the IFSH.
                                                                
 17 By transnational relations we understand, departing from Kaiser's definition (1969: 95ff.)
and in accordance with that of Risse-Kappen, regular interactions across state borders in-
volving the participation of at least one non-state actor who is not acting at the behest of a
national government or an international organization (1995: 3).
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 Although the IFSH tends to be oriented toward practice, the Institute's staff
have, both in research and teaching, concerned themselves with the theoreti-
cal treatment of transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe and
with the resurgence of old and new nationalisms that those processes in-
volve. During the winter semesters of 1995/1996 and 1996/1997, for exam-
ple, Gießmann gave seminars at the Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sci-
ences at the University of Hamburg on the subject of "Democratization in
Eastern Central Europe - a Comparative Look at Systemic Change" and on
"Possibilities and Limits of International Influence on Social Transforma-
tion Processes"; in the summer semester of 1997 he held a seminar at the
Adelphi University in Garden City, New York, on "Transition from Com-
munism to Capitalism: The East German Phenomenon". Also in the summer
semester of 1997, Lutz held an advanced seminar on the question "Is There
a Democracy Beyond Democracy as We Know It?" Zellner/Dunay (1998)
devoted a chapter to working up theories of nationalism. Eicher (1998)
offers a survey of transition theories along with an innovative rational-
choice approach, taking account of political cultures.
 
 Since 1995 the IFSH has been publishing the "OSCE Yearbook" which
generally brings together about 30 first-hand essays on developments in the
OSCE area, on the responsibilities, instruments and procedures of the
OSCE, and on its organizational development (IFSH 1995, 1996, 1997,
1998a). The OSCE Yearbooks have in the meantime started appearing in
Russian and English (IFSH 1996a, 1997a, 1998). Institute staff members
have worked on a number of general and specific OSCE issues, among
them the normative and institutional development of the CSCE/OSCE (Ja-
berg 1998), the role of the OSCE in a European security structure (Lutz
1995, 1996, 1997), the question of the CSCE/OSCE's potential of the future
of security policy (Jaberg 1992, 1998; Gießmann 1996), democracy as a
creative task of the OSCE (Gießmann 1996a), and the positions of the
individual participating states of the OSCE (Tudyka 1996). In addition,
Tudyka produced an OSCE Handbook (1997). In the winter semester of
1997/1998, Lutz held an advanced seminar at the Faculty of Philosophy and
Social Sciences of the University of Hamburg on the subject of "The OSCE
- Organization, Activities, Actors".
 The publication of the OSCE Yearbooks would not be possible without a
broad network of international cooperation, both with scholars working on
the relevant issues and with various OSCE institutions (Secretariat, ODIHR,
HCNM). The OSCE, along with the German Foreign Minister and responsi-
ble divisions of the Foreign Ministry, have over the years provided substan-
tial support for the "OSCE Yearbook". This intensive cooperation was re-
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flected in a series of events, among them a lecture by the incumbent High
Commissioner, van der Stoel, in March 1997 and a round-table talk on
"Evaluating the state of the OSCE: interlocking institutions, longterm mis-
sions, internal structure" in October 1997 which was put on in cooperation
with the European Centre for Minority Issues (Flensburg) and the Institute
for Cultural Studies in the Science Center of North Rhine-Westphalia (Es-
sen) and brought scholars and OSCE experts together.
 
 In the field of conflict control, along with conceptual work on conflicit pre-
vention and non-military solution of conflicts (Jaberg 1994; Ja-
berg/Klingenburg/Mutz 1994; Klingenburg 1994; Schlichting 1994), work
was done on the relationship between the right of self-determination and
minority rights (Heintze 1994) as well as on the current responsibilities and
weaknesses of the OSCE in the field of preventive diplomacy (Kreikemeyer
1995; Gießmann 1996). Among the specific areas of conflict control par-
ticular attention was given to the significance of the OSCE Court of Con-
ciliation and Arbitration (Lutz 1995a, Lutz/Zagorski 1996) and to ideas for
the use of international police; projects were begun on both of these issues.
Staff members of IFSH also followed with interest the political efforts of
the EU and the OSCE to assist in the management of minority problems by
means of a Stability Pact for Europe (Ehrhart 1996; Dunay/Zellner 1996) as
well as the follow-up initiatives SECI (Southeast European Cooperative
Initiative) and the Royaumont process (Ehrhart 1998a). A number of proj-
ects were undertaken on  problems relating to peacekeeping actions on the
dividing line between non-military and military conflict management. In
addition to conceptual pieces (Lutz 1993; Ehrhart/Klingenburg 1994; Klin-
genburg/Schnabel 1997)  there were analyses of  national interests in peace-
keeping missions (Ehrhart/Haglund 1995; Ehrhart 1996a) and an in-
vestigation of peacekeeping missions by particular actors (Kreikemeyer
1994) and in particular regions (Ehrhart/Klingenburg 1996).
 
 This project is thus tied in to a number of other undertakings in IFSH, each
of which investigates different aspects of conflict prevention and manage-
ment relating to the kind of primarily internal conflict that has predominated
in the OSCE area since 1989/1990.
 
 In the field of country and area analyses, the "Security Handbook"
(Gießmann/Schlichting 1995; Gießmann 1997/1998) should be mentioned
which, for Central and Eastern European states (Gießmann 1995,
1997/1998a, 1997/1998b; Eicher 1997/1998) and for the CIS area
(Schlichting 1995), provides basic military and security analyses. In addi-
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tion, the members of the "Working Group on CIS and European Security"
(under the direction of Ehrhart) have in recent years carried out a number of
projects on the problems of the area generally and on individual countries,
particularly Ukraine. Among them are works on the CIS area as a field of
tension between integration and renationalization (Ehrhart/Kreikeme-
yer/Zagorski 1993), crisis management within the CIS (Ehrhart/Kreikeme-
yer/Zagorsk 1995) and on Russian policy in armed conflicts within the CIS
(Kreikemeyer/Zagorski 1997). With regard to Ukraine, investigations were
done on Western policy approaches (Ehrhart 1997), the western orientation
of Ukrainian security policy (Kutschow 1997) and, on a broad scale, the
question of international cooperation with Ukraine (Ehrhart/Thränert 1998).
Another focal point of the work was the southern Slavic area, starting with
an investigation of the role of the UN and NATO (Karádi/Klingenburg
1995; Ehrhart/Klingenburg 1996), OSCE crisis management in the Balkan
war (Klingenburg 1995), and the overall pattern of western actions (Mutz
1996) from an analysis of the Peace Agreement of Dayton
(Karádi/Klingenburg 1996; Karádi 1997) to a general portrayal of the
southern Slavic wars of dissolution and the attempts of a variety of bodies
in the international community to control them (Karádi/Klingenburg 1999).
As part of a project supported by the Volkswagen Foundation, Zellner
examined (along with the Institute's external partner, Dunay) Hungarian
foreign policy as influenced by the competing forces of western integration,
policy toward neighboring countries, and minority policy (Zellner 1993;
Zellner/Dunay 1995, 1998). The analysis of relations with neighboring
countries focused on Romania and Slovakia. During the winter semester of
1998/1999 Eicher and Zellner will hold an exercise at the Institute for Po-
litical Science of the University of Hamburg on "Majority-Minority Con-
flicts in Central and Eastern Europe: Theoretical Approaches and Case
Studies (Hungarian Minorities in Romania and Slovakia / Russian Minori-
ties in Estonia and Latvia".
 
 All in all, the staff of IFSH has been able in recent years to acquire substan-
tial expertise on Central and Eastern European countries and the CIS area
and to establish a broad network of cooperative partners there. With Russia,
Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Albania and the post-Yugoslav area,
this covers the largest part of the countries in which we wish to examine the
effectiveness of the OSCE minority regime.
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 3. Objectives and Work Program
 
 One prerequisite of the project is an analysis of the principles, norms, rules
and procedures of the OSCE minority regime, of its relationship to other
normative and instrumental elements in the OSCE context (especially the
security dimension), and of the way in which it is related to and distinct
from other minority regimes - that of the Council of Europe, for example. In
doing this, the precedent-setting interpretation of the High Commissioner's
mandate by the practice of the incumbent (since 1993: Max van der Stoel18)
must be taken into account. On this foundation, then, a consistency analysis
of the regime is to be conducted, with a high level of internal consistency in
the regime serving as an indicator of its strength and/or efficiency (Breit-
meier/Wolf 1993: 347). In addition, there is to be a value-structure analysis
of the principles, norms and rules of the OSCE minority regime following
the classification set forth in Section 2.1.3 on "Theories of nationalism" and
providing the basis for a comparison of the specific preference structures of
the regime, the majority and the minority.
 
 
 3.1 Objectives
 
 The empirical objective of the project lies, on the one hand, in the investi-
gation of the effectiveness of the OSCE minority regime in light of the im-
plementation of the HCNM's recommendations and, on the other, in exami-
nation of the plausibility of the hypotheses established on the basis of theo-
retical considerations. The time period under investigation is from 1993
until 2000. The investigation is to encompass six of the 13 cases in which
the HCNM has so far been involved, namely, Russian minorities in Estonia,
Latvia and Ukraine19 , the Albanian minority in Macedonia and Hungarian
minorities in Romania and Slovakia. There are a number of substantive and
methodological criteria that argue for this case selection and they have to do
with both limitation and inclusion. Apart from the cost of research, it is
particularly+ methodological considerations that argue for limiting the
selection to six countries. The cases of Serbia/Kosovo and Serbia/Vojvodina
cannot be included in the investigation at the present time because the
                                                                
 18 On 2 July 1998, the Permanent Council of the OSCE extended van der Stoel's term of
office by one year beyond the two three-year terms provided for in the mandate, until 31
December 1999. It remains to be seen how his successor will interpret the mandate and
whether there will be changes in the course that has hitherto been followed.
 19 The HCNM's activity in Ukraine is concentrated on the Crimea. A number of his written
recommendations relate to problems of the Crimean Tatars but in the overall context of the
Crimean conflict they also affect, indirectly, the Russians in Ukraine.
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OSCE participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is suspended and
the HCNM, having received no entry permis sion, has not been able to work
there. Albania (Greek minority) and Croatia (esp. the Serbian minority)
would burden our investigation with two more minority state-kin state rela-
tionships. As for Lithuania and Moldova, the HCNM visited each of them
only once and made no written recommendations. Hungary appears to have
been included not so much because of the problems of the Slovakian mi-
nority who live there as because of the requirements of reciprocal diplo-
macy. Doubts about comparability owing to differing cultural and historical
conditions argued against the inclusion of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan.
 
 A number of political, methodological and theoretical considerations favour
the selection of the six cases:
 
· External Russian and Albanian minorities constitute the current politi-
cal focal point of the HCNM (IFSH 1997) while external Hungarian
minorities were an important focal point of the CSCE when the HCNM
first concerned himself with this issue in 1993 (Zaagman 1994: 172).
This corresponds to the assessments (both in the literature of that time
and currently) of the explosive potential for security policy of the exter-
nal Hungarian (Brown 1992: 404; Schöpflin 1993: 1), Albanian (Brun-
ner 1996: 159) and Russian (Brubaker 1996: 108) minorities.  The
problems surrounding the Hungarian minorities - especially owing to
internal political conditions in Slovakia until the change of government
in fall of 1998, and the possibility of a set-back in Romania despite the
basic treaties both of these countries have concluded with Hungary -
can by no means be regarded as ‘solved’; this is made clear by the fact
that the HCNM has not been able to bring his work to a conclusion in
either of the two countries.
· In methodological terms at least three groups of cases are required to
provide an adequate basis for a comparative case study. Because the
case groups have one important characteristic in common - namely, the
kin state - all comparisons that touch upon this characteristic can only
be made between the three groups of cases and not between all six.
· With regard to the empirical plausibility probe of the hypotheses that
emerge from the theoretical considerations, it is important that their in-
dependent variables be sufficiently varied:
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 - Relative strength of the minority. The cases we have chosen represent
10.1 or 7.1% 20 for Romania (1992), 14.6 or 10.8% for Slovakia (1991),
27.3 or 22.1% for Ukraine (1989)21 , 33.6 or 23.1% for Macedonia
(1994), 38.5 or 30.3% for Estonia (1989), and 48 or 34% for Latvia
(1989) and thus cover the whole range of "nationalities states" as they
are called by Brunner (1996: 44, 178, 181, 184, 189, 196).
 - Reconstitution of state and nation. In five of our six cases, a process
of new construction or reconstruction of state and nation is, at varying
stages, in progress. Only in Romania is this not the case.
 - The nature of the main problem. While problems of state-building ap-
pear to harbour the greatest potential for conflict in Estonia, Latvia and
Ukraine (the categories used here are not meant to anticipate the inves-
tigation), in the other three cases, problems of nation-building appear to
be in the forefront.
 - Level of democratic consolidation. A considerable range in the level
of democratic consolidation can be observed in these six minority states
- from the two Baltic states to Macedonia and Ukraine. Of the three kin
states only Hungary appears to have a high level of democratic consoli-
dation while in Albania and Russia it is (very) low.
 - Power advantage of the kin state. In comparison with the minority
states, Russia is a superior kin state while Albania and Hungary are
(roughly) equal.
 - Chances of integration. Our cases represent a broad range of chances
for integration into the EU and NATO. Estonia leads the minority states
(having been invited to negotiations on EU admission) followed by the
countries with association relationships (Latvia, Romania, Slovakia) as
well as Macedonia and Ukraine, as countries with which cooperative
relationships exist. The Baltic states and Romania are known to be can-
didates for the second round of NATO expansion. As for the kin states,
the range proceeds from very good chances of integration (Hungary) to
privileged (Russia) or simple (Albania) cooperative relations.
 
 The six cases must be dealt with in three case groups in order to understand
better what are the possibilities and limitations of preventive conflict man-
agement under sufficiently varied conditions.
                                                                
 20 The first figure represents the population share of all minorities, the second the share made
up by the Albanian, Russian or Hungarian minority in the country in question.
 21 Because of the complicated identity relationships in Ukraine, which affect some minorities
as well as parts of the titular nation, it will be difficult, until the all-Ukrainian census
planned for 1999, to provide dependable figures on the Russian minority (Pirie 1996;
Kuzio 1996).
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 An investigation of the effectiveness of a regime calls firstly  for identifying
areas of agreement or similarities between the rules of the regime and state
behaviour. If correspondences are found, this poses, secondly , the question
whether the actions of the state have actually been influenced by the rules of
the regime or by other factors (Nollkaemper 1992: 64). Thirdly, not only the
implementation of the rules of the regime must be examined but also the
more important question of the extent to which the goals of prevention and
stability associated with the regime have been achieved (Hasen-
clever/Mayer/Rittberger 1997: 2). The investigation of the first stage means
that in each of the six countries under investigation the recommendations of
the HCNM and the behaviour of the state in question must be compared in
detail, over the whole time-period of the investigation, in accordance with
the unified classification of our preference structure (cf. 2.1.3). The second
and third questions call for a process-analysis which would include the do-
mestic political process in the relevant countries, all related activities of the
HCNM (such as seminars, etc.) and, as necessary, other OSCE activities, as
well as the political process between the minority state and kin state. Taken
together, this constitutes the first part of the empirical section of the project.
 
 The theoretical goal of the project lies in the attempt to explain whatever
efficiency or inefficiency has been found in the regime by identifying the
factors which explain the  observance or non-observance of regime rules by
the state actors (Nollkaemper 1992: 64). In the course of this analysis we
intend to take the following steps, which build upon one another:
 
· We assume that the strategies of both majority and minority, as well as
the OSCE minority regime itself, each represent a specific ethno-politi-
cal value or preference structure. The contradictions between the pref-
erence structures of the majority and the minority constitute the ethno-
political conflict potential; the preference structure of the OSCE minor-
ity regime represents a possible offer of a solution which can be used
flexibly by the HCNM. Our basic preference-structural hypothesis as-
serts that indications as to the effectiveness of the OSCE minority re-
gime can be found in the points of agreement and the differences be-
tween the three preference structures.
· In a second step, we want to examine whether and to what extent
ethno-political preference structures and their political/tactical instru-
mentalization by particular groups of actors are influenced by progress
in the transformation process and especially by the various phases of
democratic consolidation. Our starting hypothesis here is that as con-
solidation moves forward the latitude for the tactical instrumentaliza-
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tion of preference structures at first becomes less, while in the later
phases the latitude for changes in the preference structure itself in-
creases.
· In a third step we investigate, on the international level, the influence of
asymmetrical interdependence relationships on the development of
majority-minority conflicts, distinguishing between non-complex in-
terdependence (in the sense of the kin state's classic superiority based
on power) and complex interdependence based on intensified coopera-
tion with or integration into EU and NATO. Here, our starting hy-
pothesis is that complex interdependence relationships influence ma-
jority-minority conflicts more powerfully than do non-complex ones,
bearing in mind that the configuration of the various interdependence
relationships must be taken into consideration in each case.
· In a fourth step we shall examine the (relative) influence of trans-na-
tional communications processes between the minority and the kin state
on the relationship between majority and minority within the host state.
Our starting hypothesis for this purpose is that the relative density of
the trans-national communications process in comparison with the in-
ternal one, the level of democratic consolidation in the kin state, and
the relative distance between the preference patterns communicated by
kin state and minority and those of the majority in the minority state
can provide indications as to whether the trans-national communica-
tions processes are likely to aggravate or alleviate the internal relation-
ship between majority and minority. Despite the substantial lack of any
theoretical foundation we find these considerations sufficiently inter-
esting to include them in the research plan.
 
 The theoretical question, broadly stated, has to do with the relationship
between the various explanatory dimensions and the reciprocal influences
they have on each other. To attempt an answer one must formulate a series
of hypotheses, put them into usable form and test them for plausibility (Eck-
stein 1975: 97-108), at first in one dimension and then tied together, by way
of multi-level 'games' (Putnam 1988). That constitutes the second part of
the empirical section of the project. Better linkage of a variety of compo-
nent theories, on the basis of empirical examination and the refinement of
parameters for theoretical components still to be created, should contribute
to a better understanding of security-oriented minority regimes.
 
 Policy recommendations are to be worked out on the basis of empirical
analysis and of attempts at theoretical explanations of the effectiveness or
non-effectiveness of the OSCE minority regime. They could involve the
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interpretation and the use of available instruments, the continuing normative
development of the regime and the further development of the HCNM's
mandate - but also the matter of cooperation with other instruments of pre-
vention (including those of the OSCE).
 
 
 3.2 Work Program
 
 Since the categories of empirical analysis depend on theoretical considera-
tions and the second part of the empirical portion of the project consists of
the plausibility probe of theoretically based hypotheses, we start the work
program with the theoretical construction of variables for the domestic level
(3.2.1). In a second step we create independent variables for the bilateral,
multilateral and trans-national levels and set up hypotheses regarding the
effective relationships between independent and dependent variables on
various levels (cf. 3.2.2).
 
 
 3.2.1 Variables on the Domestic Level
 
 The domestic level is of central importance for our investigation because it
is here that the ethno-political preference structures of the actors, which
make up the conflict potential, are formed and because it is only on this
level that solutions can be found and the terms of the OSCE minority re-
gime implemented. For that reason we need, as our point of departure, a
structural model of domestic political conflict that establishes a relationship
between the conflict potential which emerges from the differences between
majority and minority as shown in the ethno-political preference table, and
the changing potential for conflict solution in the course of the transforma-
tion process.
 
 Indeed Moravcsik established a theoretical foundation for the international
behaviour of state actors but this has not so far been linked with a domestic
political structural model. To attain such a structural model of ethno-politi-
cal conflict we combine Risse-Kappen's general model of domestic conflict
(1991, 1995) with Moravcsik's ideas on preference structures and specify
this model for the ethno-political dimension. Risse-Kappen distinguishes
between three groups of factors (1995: 21-23):
 
· We understand the structure of society, with regard to the extent of
social fragmentation and mobilization and in the ideal-typical version
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of 'strong' and 'weak' societies, to be an independent variable which
represents the general social conflict potential.
· We understand the nature of the social/poltical mechanism for associa-
tion and coalition-building, in its consensual and polarized forms, to be
an independent variable which represents the general potential for po-
litical conflict control.
· We regard the structure of political institutions, with a view to the
extent of their centralization (centralized vs. fragmented), viz. the de-
gree of state strength, as an intervening variable which represents the
ability of the central state to enforce its will over society.
 
 The fruitfulness of this approach lies in the further development of the con-
cept of state strength (initially, Katzenstein 1976) by linking it to the social
and political conflict structure in a manner that can be called process-ori-
ented - "how political systems respond to societal demands" (Risse-Kappen
1991: 484). We refer to the dependent variable, which expresses the rela-
tionship between problem potential and the potential for solutions, as the
'general level of conflict control and/or stability of conflict control'.
 
 The independent variable 'ethno-political fragmentation and mobilization' ,
as the measure of ethno-political conflict potential, corresponds to the inde-
pendent variable 'general social fragmentation and mobilization'  a s  a
measure of the general social conflict potential. We use the extent of civil-
cultural consolidation to measure the independent variable 'general social
fragmentation and mobilization'  because the process of civil-cultural con-
solidation has a significant influence on the origin, formation and formula-
tion of conflict in the social realm.
 
 We define the variable 'ethno-political fragmentation' as the difference
between the ethno-political preference tables, i.e. the state- and nation-
building strategies of majority and minority; the greater this difference is,
the higher will be the degree of ethno-political fragmentation.22 Because the
extent of mobilization of minority23 and majority does not necessarily fol-
low from particular state- and nation-building strategies (Brubaker 1996:
                                                                
 22 'Ethnic fragmentation' is, on the one hand, a dependent variable but (as input into a struc-
tural model of domestic political conflict) can also be regarded as an independent variable,
with the result that we treat this variable as dependent or independent according to the
question being asked in the investigation.
 23 The extent of mobilization of a minority can, for example, be operationalized as the rela-
tionship between votes cast for minority parties and the number of eligible voters of the
minority, or as the relative membership strength of minority organizations.
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 Table 2: Structural Models of General Domestic and Ethno-political Conflict
 
  General conflict control  Ethno-political conflict control
 
 
 
 
 
 Independent
 General structure of society
 Social fragmentation and mobiliza-
tion (ideological/ political)
 (high/low fragmentation = weak/
strong civil society)
 
 
 
 
 (Measure for general social conflict
potential)
 Ethno-political structure of society
 Ethno-political fragmentation and
mobilization (operationalized as
difference between nation-/state-
building strategies of majority and
minority + size of minority + extent
of mobilization of majority and
minority)
 
 (Measure of ethno-political conflict
potential)
 Variables  Social/political mechanism for
association and coalition-building
 
 Democratic Consolidation
 (structural + representative conso-
lidation)
 (Measure for general conflict-solv-
ing potential)
 Specific ethno-political mechanism
for association and coalition-build-
ing
 
 Ethnopolitical Integra tion
 
 (Measure for ethno-political con-
flict-solving potential)
 Dependent
 Variable,
rough
 General level of conflict control  Level of ethno-political conflict
control
 
 Intervening
 Variable
 State structure / political institutions
 (Centralisization vs. Fragmentation)
 Dependent
 Variable
 General stability of conflict control  Stability of ethno-political conflict
control
 
 166-167) but is a function of all options for action at any given time on the
basis of collective learning processes, the variable 'ethno-political fragmen-
tation' must be characterized in terms of the size of the minority and the
empirically established extent of mobilization of minority and majority.
 
 We determine the general social conflict-solving potential through the in-
dependent variable 'democratic consolidation' in structural and representa-
tive forms, and the specific ethno-political conflict-solving potential through
the independent variable 'ethno-political integration of the minority'24 There
is a reciprocal relationship between the two fragmentation variables as well
                                                                
 24 Provisional operationalization of the variable 'ethno-political integration of the minority':
high: lasting cooperation between majority and minority in government and/or opposition,
institutionalization of  cooperation between government and minority; middle: occasional
cooperation between majority and minority in government and/or opposition, weak insti-
tutionalization of cooperation between government and minority; low: political isolation of
the minority, lack of institutionalized cooperation between government and minority.
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as between the variables 'democratic consolidation' and 'ethno-political inte-
gration of the minority'.
 
 The dependent variable 'level of ethno-political conflict control' or, after
being filtered through the intervening variable 'state structure', the 'stability
of ethno-political conflict control' is measured in the same categories that
were applied to the ethno-political conflict potential, namely, the ability of a
political system to put through measures for gradually or substantially inclu-
sionary state-building, and measures for gradually or substantially differen-
tiating nation-building.
 
 With regard to the intervening variable 'state structure' , with the ideal-typi-
cal versions of centralistic and decentralized, we assume that a decentral-
ized state structure opens up greater opportunities for participation which
enhance the stability of ethno-polit ical conflict control, while a centralistic
state structure tends to lower the stability of conflict control.25
 We describe the level of ethno-political conflict control or, as the case may
be, stability of conflict control, as low when it only allows for measures of
acute crisis management; as medium when it allows for measures of gradu-
ally inclusionary state-building and gradually differentiating nation-build-
ing; and as high when it allows for measures of substantially inclusionary
state-building and substantially differentiating nation-building. Taken all
together, this gives us a framework of analysis (see Table 2) whose depend-
ent variables (level of conflict control and stability of conflict control)
reflect the relationship between the general and/or the ethno-political con-
flict potential and the available means for finding solutions.
 
 
 3.2.2 Hypotheses Within and Between Levels
 
 In what follows we formulate our assumptions about central causal relation-
ships in the form of hypotheses. Because the hypotheses rest on varying
and, in part, conflicting assumptions, they are to some extent themselves
contradictory. However, because we do not want to restrict ourselves from
the outset to the hypotheses that correspond most closely to our preliminary
                                                                
 25 At least on paper, all six of our cases represent centralistically organized states, with the
result that the intervening variable would have no consequences for our investigation.
However, because we have doubts in some cases about the ability of the states actually to
implement centrally reached decisions, we are for the time being retaining the intervening
variable. In what follows we shall, for the sake of brevity, generally refer only to the level
of ethno-political conflict control.
40
views - this would curtail the study's explanatory radius at too early a stage
- this contradictoriness has been consciously accepted.
 
 
 Preference-structural Starting Hypothesis
 
 H.1: The less/greater the difference between the ethno-political preference
patterns of majority and minority, the greater/less is the probability that the
OSCE minority regime, or the recommendations of the HCNM which repre-
sent a specific preference pattern, will become effective.
 
 On the basis of this general starting hypothesis, a worst-case assumption
regarding preference structures can be formulated which minimizes the
probability of the effectiveness of the OSCE minority regime:
 
 H.1 (a):  If the ethno-political preference patterns of majority and minority
do not aim in the same direction in any of their three dimensions the prob-
ability is low that the specific ethno-political preference pattern represented
by the OSCE minority regime and the recommendations of the HCNM will
become effective.
 
 We postulate as a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for the
effectiveness of the OSCE minority regime and the implementation of the
recommendations of the HCNM:
 
 H.1 (b):  The probability that the OSCE minority regime will become effec-
tive and the recommendations of the High Commissioner be implemented
rises if the ethno-political preference patterns of majority, minority and
OSCE/HCNM point in the same direction in at least one dimension.
 
 All of the following core hypotheses (2 to 7) and derivative hypotheses are
thus related to the preference-structural starting hypothesis by virtue of
formulating supplementary conditions which, directly or indirectly, affect
the ethno-political preference patterns of majority and minority and, through
them, the ethno-political conflict potential.
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 Hypotheses Regarding the Domestic Level (I)
 
 Five of the minority states we are investigating emerged from the collapse
of multi- or bi-national federations. In these cases in addition to the already
complex transformation process, the new constitution of state and nation
must also be dealt with, so that the problems of democratic consolidation
exceed the average (Segert 1997: 88). In view of the weakness of the state
and of civil society, the new constitution of state and nation is influenced
more strongly by ethno-political criteria (Schöpflin 1997: 9-10) and the
possibility of keeping the conduct of ethno-political conflicts within demo-
cratic structures is less.
 
 H.2: If state and nation in a minority state are newly constituted or - after
a long interruption - reconsitituted, the probability is great that a high de-
gree of general and (at least latent) ethno-political fragmentation, worse
than average problems with democratic consolidation and a low level of
ethno-political integration will lead to a low level of general and ethno-
political conflict control.
 
 This is all the more true when the new constitution is linked to a "stateness
problem" (Linz/Stepan 1996: 16) - i.e. either the state's borders and/or ac-
cess to citizenship are in dispute. How the specific starting situation will
further develop depends essentially on the progress of democratic consoli-
dation:
 
 H.3: The more/less advanced democratic consolidation is in a minority
state, the higher/lower is the probability that the general and ethno-political
level of conflict control will be high or rising/low or falling.26
 
 Since progress in structural and representative consolidation is one measure
of the conflict solution potential, the minimum domestic poltical require-
ments for successful ethno-political conflict management can be formulated
as follows:
 
 H.3 (a): The longer the stage of structural consolidation remains incomplete
and representative consolidation remains weak in a minority state, the
                                                                
 26 In view of the fact that there are states in Western Europe in which democratic consolida-
tion is very advanced but the ethno-political level of conflict control does not keep pace
with it (e.g. France with respect to Corsica), Hypothesis 3 must be regarded as a classic
case of a hypothesis that formulates a necessary but not adequate effect-relationship.
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greater is the probability that the level of ethno-political conflict control will
remain weak or decline.
 Moreover, we assume not only that the level of democratic consolidation
affects the level of ethnic conflict control but that the reverse relationship
also exists (Linz/Stepan 1996: 36) and come, therefore, to the following
hypothesis:
 
 H.3 (b): The longer the level of ethno-political conflict control in a minority
state remains low or declines, the greater is the probability that there will be
delay, obstruction or even setbacks in the process of democratic consolida-
tion.
 
 Thus lack of progress in democratic consolidation and the inability to exer-
cise ethno-political conflict control reinforce each other in a downward
spiral, resulting in growing likelihood of a violent outcome to the conflict
and/or massive external intervention.
 
 Hypotheses on the Domestic Political, Bilateral and Multi-lateral Levels (I,
II and III)
 
 H.4: The lower/higher the level of conflict control in a minority state, the
greater is the probability that bilateral relations between the minority state
and the kin state will deteriorate/improve.
 
 We assume, in addition, that the relationship between effects postulated in
Hypothesis 4 depends on parallelism or non-parallelism between domestic
political developments in the minority state and the kin state:
 
 H.3+H.4: The more/less parallel the process of democratic consolidation in
a minority state and a kin state and the more/less advanced it is, the greater
is the probability that the level of ethno-political conflict control in the mi-
nority state will grow/decline and that the bilateral relationship between the
minority state and the kin state will improve/deteriorate.
 
 To supplement our assumption that the control of ethno-political conflicts
depends primarily  on domestic factors, the thesis can be put forward that a
foreign power with superior power potential can, by threatening the minor-
ity state with disadvantages or denying it advantages, force it to meet the
demands of the minority. In this we conceive of power as characterized by
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 Table 3: Core Hypotheses and Derivative Hypotheses27
 
 
          Independent Variables                        Effect  à                        Dependent Variables
 Preference-structural starting hypo-thesis
 H.1      Difference between ethno-political --
            preference structures of majority
            and minority
 H.1(a)  No tangency between preference      ---
patterns of majority, minority and
            HCNM
 H.1(b)  Preference patterns of majority,       ---
            minority and HCNM point in the same
            direction in at least one dimension
 
 à  Probability of effectiveness of OSCE
      regime und HCNM
 
 à  Low probability for effectiveness of OSCE
      regime and implementation of the re-
      commendations of the HCNM
 à  Necessary condition for effectiveness of
      the OSCE regime and implementation of
      the HCNM’s recommendations
 Level I
 H.2       New constitution of state + nation---
 
 
 
 H.3      Democratic consolidation               ---
 H.3(a)  Completion of structural consolidation
 H.3(b)  Low level of conflict control            ---
 
 à  Ethno-political fragmentation /
      democratic consolidation /
      ethno-political  integration /
      level / stability of conflict control
 à  Level / stability of conflict control
 à  Level / stability of conflict control
 à  Democratic consolidation
 Levels II + I
 H.4      Level of conflict control in the       ---
            minority state
 H.3+H.4  Democratic consolidation                  ---
            in minority and kin state
 H.5      Superior power potential                ---
            of kin state
 
 à Bilateral relations
      (proportional/reciprocal)
 à  Level / stability of conflict control
      and bilateral relations
 à  Fulfilment of minority demands
 Levels III + I + II
 H.6      Chances of integration of               ---
             minority state and kin state
 H.5+H.6   Chances of integration minority state -
 
 H.6+H.2  Parallel development of democratic  ---
 (a)        consolidation/chances of integration
 H.6+H.2  Democratic consolidation and          ---
 (b)       chances of integration kin state
 H.6+H.2  Democratic consolidation and          ---
 (c)       chances of integration minority state
 H.4 (a)   Relative separation from the recipro- --
            city principle in minority and kin state
 
 à  Level / stability of conflict control and
      bilateral relations
 à  Chances of influence of non-integrated
      kin state
 à  Level / stability of conflict control and
      and bilateral relations
 à  Relative separation from the reciprocity
      principle kin state
 à  Relative separation from the reciprocity
      principle minority state
 à  Change of government in minority state
      and kin state
 Levels  IV + I + II
 H.7     Density/quality of communication ---
           between minority and kin state
 
 H.7+H.3 Interactive relationship between        ---
           minority and kin state and democratic
           consolidation kin state
 
 à  Ethno-political mobilization / ethno-
      political integration / level and stability
      of ethnopolitical conflict control
 à  Ethno-political mobilization / ethno-
      political integration / level and stability of
      ethnopolitical conflict control
 
 little sensitivity and vulnerability in a (strongly) asymmetrical interdepend-
ence relationship (Keohane/Nye 1977/1989: 12-13) and we distinguish
between complex and non-complex interdependence relationships. Non-
                                                                
 27 The hypotheses are arranged, first, according to core hypotheses (bold print) and derivative
hypotheses and, second, according to the levels of action to which they relate. The
number(s) assigned to the derivative hypotheses indicate(s) the core hypothesis(es) from
which it/they are derived; the letter in brackets which follows indicates a numeration
within the same combination group. Since all hypotheses are arranged according to levels
of action, it is possible that a derivative hypothesis, e.g. H.4 (a), may be found in a differ-
ent box of the table than its core hypothesis.
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complex, asymmetrical interdependence relationships can exist between a
kin state with superior power potential and a minority state which is eco-
nomically dependent on the former or can be militarily threatened by it.
Although the denial of advantages can play a role in this relationship, the
negative aspect ('sticks ') clearly predominates in cases of non-complex
interdependence. The concrete manifestation of complex interdependence in
the Euro-Atlantic context is the relationship of Western integration with its
core organizations, the EU and NATO. We assume that transformation
countries that are drawing closer to the EU and NATO will  increasingly
adapt themselve to the 'rules of the game' as established by those organiza-
tions. The reason for this is, on the one hand, the ability of the EU and
NATO to deny desired goods (cooperation, membership) and, on the other
hand, its possible willingness to grant these things ('carrots'). Thus we come
to the following hypothesis on the exercise of power in complex and non-
complex interdependence relationships:
 
 H.5: The greater the power potential of the kin state in its relationship to
that of a neighboring minority state, the more likely it is that the govern-
ment of the minority state will meet important demands of the minority.
 
 In this connection, we do not use the concept of conflict control because a
solution imposed from outside does not stem from the ability of a society to
deal with its conflicts in an orderly institutional framework and may indeed
reduce this ability over the long term.
 
 H.6: The greater/smaller the chances of a minority or kin state being taken
into the EU or NATO, the greater/smaller is the probability of a high level
of ethno-political conflict control and of a cooperative development of the
bilateral relationship.
 
 In the next step, two possible groups of cases are to be investigated: First, a
minority state can be a vulnerable part either of a non-complex or of a com-
plex interdependence relationship:
 
 H.5+H.6: The greater/smaller the chances of a minority stateÆs inclusion in
structures of complex interdependence (EU and NATO), the greater/smaller
is the probability that the minority state will resist the demands of a neigh-
boring kin state that has superior power and is not included in these struc-
tures of complex interdependence with regard to the treatment of minorities
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protected by the kin state, taking its lead instead from the organizational
leaders of complex interdependence.
 
 Secondly, a number of states can be candidates for inclusion in structures of
complex interdependence (EU and NATO). For that reason we combine
Hypothesis 6 with our hypotheses on the relationship between democratic
consolidation and the level of conflict control (H.3.A, H.3.B and H.3+4),
initially assuming a parallel development in the minority state and the kin
state and then an unequal one.
 
 H.6+H.2 (a): The less/more advanced democratic consolidation is in the
minority state and the kin state and the smaller/greater the chances are of
the minority state and kin state being included in the structure of western
integration, the smaller/greater is the probability that the bilateral relation-
ship between the minority state and the kin state will improve and that the
level of ethno-political conflict control in the minority state will be high or
rising.
 
 H.6+H.2 (b): The more/less advanced the degree of democratic consolida-
tion in  a kin state is and the greater/smaller the chances are for a kin state to
be included in the structure of western integration, the greater is the prob-
ability that the bilateral relationship between minority and kin state will
improve/deteriorate even if the degree of ethno-political integration of the
minority in the minority state and the level of ethno-political conflict con-
trol there do not climb or decline/rise.
 
 This latter hypothesis postulates the relative, positive or negative, separation
of a kin state from the reciprocity principle. A corresponding hypothesis
applies to the minority state. In both of the separation hypotheses we as-
sume that the domestic win set in the country in question is broader than the
acceptability set of the government, so that a new government with a
changed acceptability set can turn away from the reciprocity principle for-
mulated in Hypothesis 4. We assume, however, that a separation from the
reciprocity principle that goes too far can be corrected by a change of ma-
jority or shift of power in domestic politics and, hence, we speak of a rela-
tive separation from the reciprocity principle:
 
 H.4 (a): The farther and the longer a kin state, in its relationship to a minor-
ity state (or the other way around), separates itself from the principle of
reciprocity between the level of ethno-political conflict control and the char-
46
acter of bilateral relations, and the less advanced democratic consolidation
is in the country that is separating itself from reciprocity, the more probable
it is that there will be a change of government or coalition in that country
resulting in a renewed worsening of bilateral relations and/or of the level of
conflict control.
 
 
 Hypotheses on the Domestic Political, Bilateral and Trans-national level (I,
II and IV)
 
 Because we assume that the modes of strategic and communicative behav-
iour combine with each other, especially on the trans-national level, we
want to investigate the interactive relationship between  a kin state and 'its'
minorities:
 
 H.7: The more/less intense the trans-national interactive relationship  be-
tween the government of a kin state and 'its' minority is and the more/less
the ethno-political preference structures thereby transmitted diverge from
those of the majority, the greater/smaller is the probability that the ethno-
political mobilization of the minority will rise, its ethno-political integration
and the level of ethno-political conflict control will decline, and the bilateral
relationship between the minority state and the kin state will deteriorate.
 
 H.7+H.3: The lower/higher the degree of democratic consolidation in a kin
state, the greater/smaller is the probability that in the interaction between
kin state and minority ethno-political preference patterns will be transmitted
which deviate substantially from those of the majority and that, as a conse-
quence, the ethno-political mobilization of the minority will rise, its ethno-
political integration and the level of ethno-political conflict control will
decline, and the bilateral relationship between the minority state and the kin
state will deteriorate.
 
 
 3.2.3 Outline of the Theoretical Work
 
 Although it is not easy to describe the continuation of the theoretical work
in detail but the following steps can be given in rough outline:
· Continuation of the scholarly discussion in the pertinent areas of the-
ory, refinement of the analytical instruments of the project;
· Refinement of the hypotheses, particularly the derivative ones;
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· Comparison of the ethno-political preference patterns of majority, mi-
nority and HCNM as well as of the status of implementation of the
HCNM's recommendations for individual minority states, for the
groups of minority states with minorities of the same nation, and for all
six minority states:
· Plausibility probe of the hypotheses, on the basis of the empirical mate-
rial that has been gathered, for the individual minority states, for the
groups of minority states with minorities of the same nation, and for all
six minority states - asking which hypotheses explain changes in the
differences between the ethno-political preference patterns of the ma-
jority, minority and the HCNM, and which ones do not.
· Heuristic examination of the project's analytical instruments in light of
the results of the plausibility probe of hypotheses.
 
 
 3.2.4 The Empirical Implementation of the Project
 
 The implementation of the project, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, is
quite demanding. Depending on the final operationalization, it calls for
establishing about three dozen sets of data for six countries over a period of
eight years as shown in table 4. Some of the data sets can be acquired rela-
tively easily (e.g. the number of parties in parliaments or the chances of
inclusion in EU and NATO) and for others material is already available for
our use. Still others, such as the ethno-political preference patterns of the
various actors or the extent of ethno-political integration require thorough
process analyses before a classification can be undertaken. There is also the
problem that a substantial portion of the material cannot be obtained from
the usual international sources (including the internet), but must be acquired
locally in up to nine languages (in addition to the working languages,
English and German). This relates in particular to the variables 'structural
consolidation', 'representative consolidation' and 'ethno-political fragmenta-
tion and mobilization'. This will require, apart from the two main project
researchers, the use of one paid researcher for each minority country.
Moreover, there are some variables which will have to be tested for the
three kin states, even if not with the same degree of thoroughness.
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 a) Examining the Status of Implementation of the HCNM's Recommenda-
tions
 
· Survey of all recommendations of the High Commissioner for the six
states under investigation from 1993 until 2000 and their classification
according to the ethno-political preference pattern develped in section
2.1.3 on "Theories of Nationalism";
· Summarizing these classifications to create country profiles with re-
spect to the HCNM's recommendations;
· Uniting the country profiles together to create an overall profile of the
HCNM's recommendations, including the identification of possible
typical divergences from one country to another;
· Surveying the status of implementation of the HCNM's recommenda-
tions in law and practice, and classification according to the ethno-po-
litical preference pattern;
· Process analysis on the question of whether correspondences between
the recommendations of the HCNM and state behaviour represent a
causal relationship;
· Interviews with the HCNM and his advisers as well as with officials of
OSCE missions and other OSCE institutions;
· Interviews in the six minority countries with officials of ministries,
minority associations, parties, etc. on the status of implementation of
the HCNM's recommendations and on the process analysis; we have
planned two phases of a week each per country in September/October
1999 and in September/October 2000.
Experience has shown that a careful study of sources and documents leaves
a core of questions, especially ones concerning the reconstruction of proc-
esses and their evaluation as well as changes of interest and preferences,
which can only be clarified through interviews with the participants (offi-
cials of ministries, parties, minority associations, OSCE personnel). On the
other hand, a thorough working up of the material is neccessary in order to
make efficient use of the brief interview time available. For that reason we
plan to begin interviews in the minority countries only after nine months of
preliminary work have been completed. Moreover, interviews with the
HCNM's advisers will be held first to prepare the way for the more costly
interviews in the minority countries. For reasons of methodology - espe-
cially the desire to achieve greater distance/objectivity with regard to the
subject matter and the interviewees - all interviews will in principle be con-
ducted by the two main project researchers. Oral, partially standardized,
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Table 4: Summary of operationalization (provisional)
 Variable  Operationalization
 1. Civil cultural consolidation (still to be completed)
 2. Structural consolidation · Rule of law (e.g. as per Gastil 1989/1990[ff.]
· Decision-making modus of the political
system (majority vs. consensus priniciple)
· Institutional efficiency (efficient limita-
tion of competences between state organi-
zations and decision-making within con-
stitutionally defined institutions)
 3. Representative consolidation · Type of integration of the parties· Number of members of the parties
· Number of parties and parliamentary
election alliances in the parliament
· Aggregation index (share of strongest
fraction : number of fractions)
· Volatility rate
· Voters’ turn-out
· Stability of the government (type, num-
ber, average duration of the government)
· Opinion polls on confidence in democ-
racy
4. Ethno-political fragmentation and
    mobilization 
· Difference in the ethno-political prefer-
ence patterns of majority and minority
· Size of the minority settlement pattern
· Mobilization of majority and minority
(e.g. protest actions)
· Relative success in elections by minority
parties and nationalist parties of the ma-
jority
· Membership in minority organizations
and nationalist parties of the majority
 5. Ethno-political integration · High: lasting political co-operation be-tween majority and minority, institution-
alization  of the cooperation between
government and minority
· Mid: occasional political cooperation
between majority and minority, weak in-
stitutionalization of the cooperation be-
tween government and minority
· Low: political isolation of the minority,
absence of institutionalized cooperation
between government and minority
 6. Power relation kin state / minority state · inhabitants + GDP + military potential 7. Chances of integration into EU and NATO · High: membership or invitation to  acces-sion negotiations
· Mid: association agreement with
EU/named candidate of second wave of
NATO expansion
· Low: simple or privileged cooperative
relationships
 8. Density and character of the interaction    between kin state and minority state 
· Density: a) institutionalization of the
interaction between political elites b)
share of the minority, that watches TV
programmes of the kin state regularly
· Character: ethno-political preference
patterns
 9. Level of ethno-political conflict regulation   (dependent variable) 
· High: capable of measures of substan-
tially more inclusive state-building
strategies or substantially more differenti-
ating nation-building strategies
· Medium : capable of measures of gradu-
ally more inclusive state-building strate-
gies or gradually more differentiating na-
tion-building strategies
· Low: capability of measures of acute
crisis management
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 interview formats will be used, which have the advantage of combining a
fixed list of questions with the possibility of a flexibly conducted conver-
sation.
 
· Comparison of the status of implementation of the HCNM's recommen-
dations(classified according to the ethno-political preference pattern)
between the minority states with minorities of the same nation and be-
tween all six minority states under investigation.
 
 b) Review of Hypotheses for Explaining the Status of Implementation of the
HCNM's Recommendations.
 
· Working out the final operationalization of the variables plus test runs;
· Identifying and acquiring the standard sources and documents needed
for an empirical review of the operationalizations, in particular reports
of the OSCE, the Council of Europe, other international organizations,
governments and large NGOs (e.g. Amnesty International, International
Helsinki Federation);
· Creating a data bank;
· Empirical working up of the operationalizations of the variables for the
years 1993 to 2000;
· Expert interviews in September/October 1999 and September/October
2000 to follow up on and provide more depth for issues on which the
accessible written material is inadequate, for example in connection
with the variable 'ethno-political integration'.
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